Judgment Aggregation

The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  List, Christian ^a   Puppe, Clemens ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Conditional entailment; Distance based aggregation; Independence; Judgment aggregation; Non affineness; Premise based aggregation; Total blockedness

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920753792     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0020     Document Type: Chapter

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