Majority voting on restricted domains

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 512-543

  Dietrich, Franz ^a,b   List, Christian ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Analogues of single peakedness; Consistency; Domain restriction; Judgment aggregation; Majority voting; May's theorem; Value restriction

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949490000     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.003     Document Type: Article

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