The theory of judgment aggregation: An introductory review

Synthese

Volumn 187, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 179-207

  List, Christian ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Arrow's impossibility theorem; Condorcet's paradox; Democracy; Discursive dilemma; Judgment aggregation; Social choice theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84863222410     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0025-3     Document Type: Review

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