The impossibility of a Paretian rational: A Bayesian perspective

Economics Letters

Volumn 96, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 45-50

  Nehring, Klaus ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian aggregation; Group choice; Judgment aggregation; Opinion pool; Pareto principle

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249649706     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.008     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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