Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems

Theoretical Computer Science

Volumn 410, Issue 52, 2009, Pages 5425-5442

  Betzler, Nadja ^a   Uhlmann, Johannes ^a  

^a FRIEDRICH SCHILLER UNIVERSITY JENA   (Germany)

Author keywords

Computational social choice; Copeland voting; Digraph modification problems; NP hardness; Plurality voting; W 1 W 2 hardness

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE; DIGRAPH MODIFICATION PROBLEMS; NP-HARDNESS; PLURALITY VOTING; W [1]-/W [2]-HARDNESS;

HARDNESS;

VOTING MACHINES;

EID: 70350568190     PISSN: 03043975     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2009.05.029     Document Type: Article

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