Copeland voting fully resists constructive control

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5034 LNCS, Issue , 2008, Pages 165-176

  Faliszewski, Piotr ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^a   Rothe, Jörg ^c  

^a University of Rochester   (United States)

^b ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Computational social choice theory; Multiagent systems; Preference aggregation

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC ASPECTS; COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY; CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL; EXTERNAL-; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES; MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS; PREFERENCE AGGREGATION;

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT;

EID: 48249127562     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68880-8_17     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (19)

1. Bartholdi III, J., Tovey, C., Trick, M.: Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election. Social Choice and Welfare 6(2), 157-165 (1989)
2. Bartholdi III, J., Tovey, C., Trick, M.: How hard is it to control an election? Mathematical and Computer Modeling 16(8/9), 27-40 (1992)
3. Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T., Lang, J.: When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? Journal of the ACM 54(3) Article 14(2007)
4. Copeland, A.: A "reasonable" social welfare function. Mimeographed notes from a Seminar on Applications of Mathematics to the Social Sciences, University of Michigan (1951)
5. Downey, R., Fellows, M.: Parameterized Complexity. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
6. Erdélyi, G., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J., Spakowski, H.: Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time and generalized juntas (manuscript, December 2007)
7. Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L.: The complexity of bribery in elections. In: Proc. AAAI 2006, pp. 641-646. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2006)
8. Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and control. Technical report, Department of Computer Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY (in preparation)
9. Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Llull and Copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control. In: Proc. AAAI 2007, pp. 724-730. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2007)
10. Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative. Artificial Intelligence 171(5-6), 255-285 (2007)
11. Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control. In: Proc. IJCAI 2007, pp. 1308-1314. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2007)
12. Homan, C., Hemaspaandra, L.: Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners. Journal of Heuristics (to appear). Full version available as [13]
13. Homan, C., Hemaspaandra, L.: Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding Dodgson-election winners. Technical Report TR-881, Department of Computer Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, September 2005. Revised (June 2007)
14. Lenstra Jr., H.: Integer programming with a fixed number of variables. Mathematics of Operations Research 8(4), 538-548 (1983)
15. Merlin, V., Saari, D.: Copeland method II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes. Journal of Economic Theory 72(1), 148-172 (1997)
16. Procaccia, A., Rosenschein, J., Kaminka, G.: On the robustness of preference aggregation in noisy environments. In: Proc. AAMAS 2007, pp. 416-422. ACM Press, New York (2007)
17. Procaccia, A., Rosenschein, J., Zohar, A.: Multi-winner elections: Complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination. In: Proc. IJCAI 2007, pp. 1476-1481. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2007)
18. Saari, D., Merlin, V.: The Copeland method I: Relationships and the dictionary. Economic Theory 8(1), 51-76 (1996)
19. Zermelo, E.: Die Berechnung der Turnier-Ergebnisse als ein Maximumproblem der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Mathematische Zeitschrift 29(1), 436-460 (1929)