Sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting broadly resists control

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5162 LNCS, Issue , 2008, Pages 311-322

  Erdélyi, Gábor ^a   Nowak, Markus ^a   Rothe, Jörg ^a  

^a HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Approval voting; Artificial intelligence; Complexity of procedural control; Complexity theory

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTERS; FOUNDATIONS; VOTING MACHINES;

APPROVAL VOTING; COMPLEXITY OF PROCEDURAL CONTROL; COMPLEXITY THEORY; CONTROL ACTIONS; CONTROL PROBLEMS; CONTROL SCENARIOS; CONTROL TYPES; EXTERNAL AGENTS; NP-HARD; PREFERENCE RANKINGS; PREFERENCE-BASED; VOTING SYSTEMS;

COMPUTER SCIENCE;

EID: 54249124079     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85238-4_25     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (25)

1. Bartholdi III, J., Tovey, C., Trick, M.: The computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare 6(3), 227-241 (1989)
2. Bartholdi III, J., Tovey, C., Trick, M.: Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election. Social Choice and Welfare 6(2), 157-165 (1989)
3. Bartholdi III, J., Tovey, C., Trick, M.: How hard is it to control an election? Mathematical Comput. Modelling 16(8/9), 27-40 (1992)
4. Brams, S., Fishburn, P.: Approval voting. American Political Science Review 72(3), 831-847 (1978)
5. Brams, S., Fishburn, P.: Approval Voting. Birkhauser, Boston (1983)
6. Brams, S., Fishburn, P.: Voting procedures. In: Arrow, K., Sen, A., Suzumura, K. (eds.) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 1, pp. 173-236. North-Holland, Amsterdam (2002)
7. Brams, S., Sanver, R.: Voting systems that combine approval and preference. In: Brams, S., Gehrlein, W., Roberts, F. (eds.) The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn. Springer, Heidelberg (to appear)
8. Brams, S., Sanver, R.: Critical strategies under approval voting: Who gets ruled in and ruled out. Electoral Studies 25(2), 287-305 (2006)
9. Duggan, J., Schwartz, T.: Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized. Social Choice and Welfare 17(1), 85-93 (2000)
10. Dwork, C., Kumar, R., Naor, M., Sivakumar, D.: Rank aggregation methods for the web. In: Proc. WWW 2001, pp. 613-622. ACM Press, New York (2001)
11. Ephrati, E., Rosenschein, J.: Multi-agent planning as a dynamic search for social consensus. In: Proc. IJCAI 1993, pp. 423-429 (1993)
12. Erdelyi, G., Nowak, M., Rothe, J.: Sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting fully resists constructive control and broadly resists destructive control. Technical Report cs.GT/0806.0535, ACM Computing Research Repository (CoRR) (June 2008)
13. Everaere, P., Konieczny, S., Marquis, P.: The strategy-proofness landscape of merging. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 28, 49-105 (2007)
14. Fagin, R., Kumar, R., Sivakumar, D.: Efficient similarity search and classification via rank aggregation. In: Proc. ACM SIGMOD Intern. Conf.on Management of Data, pp. 301-312. ACM Press, New York (2003)
15. Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: A richer understanding of the complexity of election systems. In: Ravi, S., Shukla, S. (eds.) Fundamental Problems in Computing: Essays in Honor of Professor Daniel J. Rosenkrantz. Springer, Heidelberg (to appear, 2006); Available as Technical Report cs.GT/0609112, ACM Computing Research Repository (CoRR), September 2006
16. Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Llull and Copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control. In: Proc. AAAI 2007, pp. 724-730. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2007)
17. Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Copeland voting fully resists constructive control. In: Proc. AAIM 2008, June 2008, pp. 165-176. Springer, Heidelberg (to appear, 2008)
18. Garey, M., Johnson, D.: Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness. W.H. Freeman, New York (1979)
19. Ghosh, S., Mundhe, M., Hernandez, K., Sen, S.: Voting for movies: The anatomy of recommender systems. In: Proc. 3rd Annual Conference on Autonomous Agents, pp. 434-435. ACM Press, New York (1999)
20. Gibbard, A.: Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica 41(4), 587-601 (1973)
21. Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative. In: Proc. AAAI 2005, pp. 95-101. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2005)
22. Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative. Artificial Intelligence 171(5-6), 255-285 (2007)
23. Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L., Rothe, J.: Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control. In: Proc. IJCAI 2007, pp. 1308-1314. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2007)
24. Procaccia, A., Rosenschein, J., Zohar, A.: Multi-winner elections: Complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination. In: Proc. IJCAI 2007, pp. 1476-1481. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2007)
25. Satterthwaite, M.: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10(2), 187-217 (1975)