Analysis of corporate disclosures on relative performance evaluation

Accounting Horizons

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 235-246

  Bannister, James W ^a   Newman, Harry A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HARTFORD   (United States)

^b FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation committee report; Disclosure; Peer group; Relative performance evaluation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646852157     PISSN: 08887993     EISSN: 15587975     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/acch.2003.17.3.235     Document Type: Article

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