Financial accounting information and corporate governance

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 1-3, 2001, Pages 237-333

  Bushman, Robert M ^a   Smith, Abbie J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Compensation; Corporate governance; Financial accounting; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000108966     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00027-1     Document Type: Article

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