Strategic managerial incentive compensation in Japan: Relative performance evaluation and product market collusion

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 81, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 303-313

  Joh, Sung Wook ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040034988     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003465399558094     Document Type: Article

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