An empirical analysis of cancelled mergers, board composition and ownership structure

Applied Financial Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 7, 2002, Pages 485-491

  Davidson III, Wallace N ^a   Rosenstein, Stuart ^a   Sundaram, Sridhar ^a  

^a GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE; MERGER;

EID: 0036288983     PISSN: 09603107     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09603100010005302     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition
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3. The rationale behind interfirm tender offers
4. Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills
5. Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offers
6. Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?
7. CEO and board chair roles held jointly or separately: Much ado about nothing?
8. A reexamination of the market reaction to failed mergers
9. Merger proposals, management discretion, and stockholder wealth
10. Tender offers and stockholder returns: An empirical analysis
11. Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure
12. Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and controls when firms default
13. The market for corporate control: The empirical evidence since 1980
14. The market for corporate control
15. Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence
16. Board composition and shareholder wealth: The case of management buyouts
17. Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers
18. The role of outside directors in bank acquisitions
19. One hat too many: Key executive plurality and shareholder wealth