Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 650-669

  Dharwadkar, Ravi ^a   George, Gerard ^a   Brandes, Pamela ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034339147     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amr.2000.3363533     Document Type: Review

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