Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 2-3, 1995, Pages 237-269

  Yermack, David ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Executive compensation; Incentives; Stock options

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000399928     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(95)00829-4     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior
2. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
3. The impact of long-range managerial compensation plans on shareholder wealth
4. Panel data
5. Employee compensation and firms' research and development activity
6. Executive incentives and the horizon problem
7. The effect of executive stock option plans on stockholders and bondholders
8. The association between executive stock option plan changes and managerial decision making
9. The structure of corporate ownership Causes and consequences
10. Agency delayed compensation and the structure of executive remuneration
11. Financing constraints and corporate investment
12. Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
13. Resolving the agency problems of external capital through options
14. Probing the record of stock options
15. Managerial incentives and capital management
16. The sensitivity of labor-supply parameter estimates to unobserved individual effects Fixed- and random-effects estimates in a nonlinear model using panel data
17. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
18. Performance pay and top-management incentives
19. Top-management compensation and capital structure
20. Executive stock option plans and corporate dividend policy
21. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts
22. Portfolio considerations in valuing executive compensation
23. Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: An empirical analysis
24. Risk sharing and the theory of the firm
25. The effects of financial reporting costs on the use of employee stock options
26. Disqualifying dispositions of incentive stock options Tax benefits versus financial reporting costs
27. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
28. Theory of rational option pricing
29. On the pooling of time series and cross section data
30. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis
31. Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover
32. Determinants of corporate borrowing
33. Repricing executive stock options in a down market
34. Incentive and tax effects of executive compensation plans
35. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
36. Valuing employee stock option plans using option pricing models