Choosing constraints as a third solution to agency

Journal of Management Studies

Volumn 41, Issue 7, 2004, Pages 1171-1197

  Michael, Steven C ^a   Pearce II, John A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 8744224174     PISSN: 00222380     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00471.x     Document Type: Article

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