The best test theory of extension: First principle(s)

Mind and Language

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 321-355

  Rupert, Robert D ^a  

^a NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033196060     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00115     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Akins, K. 1996: Of Sensory Systems and the 'Aboutness' of Mental States. Journal of Philosophy, 93, 337-72.
2. Astington, J.W. 1993: The Child's Discovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
3. Baker, L.R. 1991: Has Content Been Naturalized? In B. Loewer and G. Rey, 1991, 17-32.
4. Boghossian, P.A. 1991: Naturalizing Content. In B. Loewer and G. Rey 1991, 65-86.
5. Bower, T.G.R. 1989: The Rational Infant: Learning in Infancy. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company.
6. Brown, D. 1996: A Furry Tile about Mental Representation. Philosophical Quarterly, 46, 448-66.
7. Burge, T. 1986: Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review, 95, 3-45.
8. Carey, S. 1985: Conceptual Change in Childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9. Cherniak, C. 1986: Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Churchland, P. 1981: Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67-90.
11. Clark, A. (Andy) 1991. In Defense of Explicit Rules. In W. Ramsay, S.P. Stich, and D.E. Rumelhart (eds), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 115-28.
12. Clark, A. and Toribio, J. 1994: Doing without Representing? Synthese, 101, 401-31.
13. Clark, A. (Austen) 1993: Mice, Shrews, and Misrepresentation. Journal of Philosophy, 90, 290-310.
14. Cummins, R. 1989: Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
15. Devitt, M. 1994: The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics. Journal of Philosophy, 91, 545-72.
16. Devitt, M., and Sterelny, K. 1987: Language and Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
17. Dretske, F. 1981: Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
18. Dretske, F. 1986: Misrepresentation. In R.J. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content and Function. Oxford University Press.
19. Dretske, F. 1988: Explaining Behavior. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
20. Dupre, J. 1981: Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa. Philosophical Review, 90, 66-90.
21. Field, H. 1990: 'Narrow' Aspects of Intentionality and the Information-Theoretic Approach to Content. In E. Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
22. Fodor, J. 1986: Banish DisContent. In J. Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 420-38. Citations are to Lycan.
23. Fodor, J. 1986: Banish DisContent. In J. Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 420-38. Citations are to Lycan.
24. Fodor, J.A. 1987: Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
25. Fodor, J.A. 1990: A Theory of Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
26. Fodor, J. 1994: The Elm and the Expert. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
27. Fodor, J. and Pylyshyn, Z. 1988: Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis. Cognition, 28, 3-71.
28. Forster, K. 1990: Lexical Processing. In D. Osherson and H. Lasnick (eds), An Invitation to Cognitive Science, vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 95-131.
29. Gleick, J. 1987: Chaos: Making a New Science. New York: Penguin.
30. Godfrey-Smith, P. 1991: Signal, Decision, Action. Journal of Philosophy, 88, 709-22.
31. Godfrey-Smith, P. 1992: Indication and Adaptation. Synthese, 92, 283-312.
32. Gould, S.J. 1983: What, if Anything, is a Zebra? In S.J. Gould, Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 355-65.
33. Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. 1996: Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
34. Horgan, T. and Woodward, J. 1985: Folk Psychology Is Here to Stay. Philosophical Review, 94.
35. Hull, D. 1978: A Matter of Individuality. Philosophy of Science, 45, 335-60.