Minding One's Cognitive Systems: When Does a Group of Minds Constitute a Single Cognitive Unit?

Episteme

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 177-188

  Rupert, Robert ^a  

^a TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010705016     PISSN: 17423600     EISSN: 17500117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3366/epi.2004.1.3.177     Document Type: Article

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