Unconscious modulation of the conscious experience of voluntary control

Cognition

Volumn 104, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 459-475

  Linser, Katrin ^a   Goschke, Thomas ^a  

^a DRESDEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Action effects; Agency; Effect anticipation; Experienced control; Illusion of control; Priming; Subliminal

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; CONSCIOUSNESS; CONTROL SYSTEM; EXPERIENCE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; ILLUSION; MODULATION; NORMAL HUMAN; PERCEPTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; STIMULUS; STIMULUS RESPONSE; UNCONSCIOUSNESS; VOLUNTARY MOVEMENT;

ADULT; CONSCIOUSNESS; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; SUBLIMATION; UNCONSCIOUS (PSYCHOLOGY); VOLITION;

EID: 34447272680     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.07.009     Document Type: Article

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