Chapter 60 Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions

Handbook of Econometrics

Volumn 6, Issue SUPPL. PART A, 2007, Pages 3847-3965

  Athey, Susan ^a,b   Haile, Philip A ^b,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

auctions; estimation; identification; testing

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049157418     PISSN: 15734412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4412(07)06060-6     Document Type: Review

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