An empirical model of the multi-unit, sequential, clock auction

Journal of Applied Econometrics

Volumn 21, Issue 8, 2006, Pages 1221-1247

  Donald, Stephen G ^a   Paarsch, Harry J ^b   Robert, Jacques ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^c HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846085105     PISSN: 08837252     EISSN: 10991255     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jae.854     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. Andrews D. 1989. Power in econometric applications. Econometrica 57: 1059-1090.
2. Black J, de Meza D. 1992. Systematic price differences between successive auctions are no anomaly. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 1: 607-628.
3. Donald S, Paarsch H, Robert J. 1996. Identification, estimation, and testing in empirical models of sequential, oral, ascending-price auctions within the independent private-values paradigm. Department of Economics, University of Iowa, typescript.
4. Horowitz J. 2001. The bootstrap in econometrics. In Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 5, Heckman J, Learner E (eds). North-Holland: New York.
5. Katzman B. 1999. A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands. Journal of Economic Theory 86: 77-99.
6. Krishna V. 2002. Auction Theory. Academic Press: San Diego.
7. Laffont J-J, Robert J. 2000. Intra-day dynamics in sequential auctions. Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse, typescript.
8. Laffont J-J, Ossard H, Vuong Q. 1995. Econometrics of first-price auctions. Econometrica 63: 953-980.
9. McAfee R, Vincent D. 1993. The declining price anomaly. Journal of Economic Theory 60: 191-212.
10. Milgrom P. 2004. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
11. Milgrom P, Weber R. 1982. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 50: 1089-1122.
12. Milgrom P, Weber R. 2000. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, II. In The Economic Theory of Auctions, Klemperer P (ed.). Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.
13. Paarsch H, Robert J. 1995. Sequential, oral, ascending-price, open-exit auctions with multi-unit demand and an application to the sale of Siberian timber export permits. Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, typescript.
14. Weber R. 1983. Multiple-object auctions. In Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting: Uses and Theory, Engelbrecht-Wiggans R, Shubik M, Stark R (eds). New York University Press: New York.