Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 108, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 72-110

  Haile, Philip A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Endogenous valuations; Loser's curse; Resale markets; Signaling; Winner's curse

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038743044     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00010-8     Document Type: Article

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