Chapter 64 Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization

Handbook of Econometrics

Volumn 6, Issue SUPPL. PART A, 2007, Pages 4277-4415

  Reiss, Peter C ^a   Wolak, Frank A ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

auctions; entry; market power; regulation; structural econometric model

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049098474     PISSN: 15734412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4412(07)06064-3     Document Type: Review

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