How to set minimum acceptable bids, with an application to real estate auctions

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 391-416

  McAfee, R Preston ^a   Quan, Daniel C ^b   Vincent, Daniel R ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS   (United States)

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036946616     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00183     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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