Chapter 29 Empirical Models of Entry and Market Structure

Handbook of Industrial Organization

Volumn 3, Issue , 2007, Pages 1845-1886

  Berry, Steven ^a   Reiss, Peter ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Discrete games; Entry; Exit; Fixed costs; Market structure; Multiple equilibria

Indexed keywords

EID: 54149120135     PISSN: 1573448X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03029-9     Document Type: Review

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