Structural estimation of the affiliated private value auction model

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 171-193

  Li, Tong ^a   Perrigne, Isabelle ^a   Vuong, Quang ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036334315     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3087429     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Distribution free tests of independence based on the sample distribution function
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4. Identification, estimation, and testing in parametric empirical models of auctions within the independent private values paradigm
5. First-price sealed-bid auctions with secret reservation prices
6. Auctioning and bargaining: An econometric study of timber auctions with secret reservation prices
7. The winner's curse and bidder competition in acquisitions: Evidence from failed bank auctions
8. Lectures on inverse problems
9. Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions
10. Empirical testing of auction theory
11. Games with incomplete information played by bayesian Players
12. Testing Informational assumptions in common value bidding models
13. Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: A laboratory study
14. Structural analysis of auction data
15. Econometrics of first-price auctions
16. Conditionally independent private information in ocs wildcat auctions
17. Semiparametric estimation of the optimal reserve price in first-price auctions
18. Auctions with entry
19. Updating the reserve price in common-value auctions
20. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding
21. Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions
22. The role of information in U.S. offshore oil and gas lease auctions
23. Conditions for identification in nonparametric and parametric models
24. Optimal rates of convergence for nonparametric regressions
25. Some evidence on the winner's curse
26. Counterspeculation, auctions, and sealed tenders
27. A bidding model of perfect competition