Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data

European Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-35

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

Auctions; Econometrics of auction data; Game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001810166     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00017-7     Document Type: Article

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