Learning to play Bayesian games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 282-303

  Dekel, Eddie ^a,b   Fudenberg, Drew ^c   Levine, David K ^d  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642437983     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00121-0     Document Type: Article

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