Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 427-453

  McAdams, David ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric auctions; First price auctions; Monotonicity

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847307068     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0038-1     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Hendricks K, Pinkse J, Porter R (2003) Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions. Rev Econ Stud 70:115-146
2. Kagel J, Levin D (2002) Common value auctions and the Winner's curse. Princeton University Press, New Jersey
3. Maskin E, Riley J (2000) Equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions. Rev Econ Stud 67:439-454
4. McAdams D (2006) Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation. J Econ Theory (forthcoming)
5. Milgrom P, Weber R (1982) A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 50:1089-1122
6. Reny P, Zamir S (2004) On the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions. Econometrica 72:1105-1125
7. Rodriguez G (2000) First-price auctions: monotonicity and uniqueness. Int J Game Theory 29:413-432