Behavioural social choice: A status report

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 364, Issue 1518, 2009, Pages 833-843

  Regenwetter, Michel ^a   Grofman, Bernard ^b   Popova, Anna ^a   Messner, William ^a   Davis Stober, Clintin P ^a   Cavagnaro, Daniel R ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral social choice; Decision making; Voting paradoxes

Indexed keywords

DATABASE; DECISION MAKING; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; GAME THEORY; LABORATORY METHOD; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 60349098925     PISSN: 09628436     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0259     Document Type: Article

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