A general concept of scoring rules: General definitions, statistical inference, and empirical illustrations

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 211-228

  Regenwetter, Michel ^a   Rykhlevskaia, Elena ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547476541     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0204-1     Document Type: Article

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