General concepts of value restriction and preference majority

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 149-173

  Regenwetter, Michel ^a   Marley, A A J ^b   Grofman, Bernard ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042919000     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0210-5     Document Type: Article

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