Approval voting and positional voting methods: Inference, relationship, examples

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 539-566

  Regenwetter, Michel ^a   Tsetlin, Ilia ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b INSEAD   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2442706483     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0232-z     Document Type: Article

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