Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the condorcet jury theorem

Journal of Political Philosophy

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 277-306

  List, Christian ^a   Goodin, Robert E ^b  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035603046     PISSN: 09638016     EISSN: 14679760     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9760.00128     Document Type: Article

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