Choosing subsets: A size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 423-443

  Regenwetter, Michel ^a   Grofman, Bernard ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032391321     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050115     Document Type: Article

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