The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 387-398

  Tsetlin, Ilia ^a   Regenwetter, Michel ^b   Grofman, Bernard ^c  

^a INSEAD   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242627507     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0269-z     Document Type: Article

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