On the probabilities of correct or incorrect majority preference relations

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 283-306

  Tsetlin, IIia ^a   Regenwetter, Michel ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037630412     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550200182     Document Type: Article

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