On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 183-207

  Merlin, V ^a   Tataru, M ^b,c   Valognes, F ^a,d  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

^b The College of New Jersey   (United States)

^c NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF NAMUR   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Condorcet; D71; Decision making; Probability; Schl fli; Voting rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034148069     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00012-9     Document Type: Article

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