The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 171-182

  Van Deemen, Adrian ^a  

^a RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033479859     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050138     Document Type: Article

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