On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 451-466

  Regenwetter, Michel ^a   Grofman, Bernard ^b   Marley, A A J ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Condorcet criterion; Majority rule; Semiorders; Survey data; Voting; Weak orders

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036335511     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00022-7     Document Type: Article

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