Evolution of signalling systems with multiple senders and receivers

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 364, Issue 1518, 2009, Pages 771-779

  Skyrms, Brian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Information; Population dynamics; Signalling; Teamwork

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY; INFORMATION PROCESSING; POPULATION DYNAMICS; SIGNALING;

EID: 60349088806     PISSN: 09628436     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0258     Document Type: Article

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