Evolution and the explanation of meaning

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-27

  Huttegger, Simon M ^a  

^a KONRAD LORENZ INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTION AND COGNITION RESEARCH   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35348826920     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/519477     Document Type: Article

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