Robustness in signaling games

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 74, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 839-847

  Huttegger, Simon M ^a  

^a KONRAD LORENZ INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTION AND COGNITION RESEARCH   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 46649088923     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/525625     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (11)

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2. D'Arms, Justin, Robert Batterman, and Krzysztof Górny (1998), "Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice", Philosophy of Science 65:76-102.
3. Hirsch, Morris W, and Stephen Smale (1974), Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems, and Linear Algebra. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
4. Hofbauer, Josef, and Karl Sigmund (1998), Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Huttegger, Simon M. (2007), "Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning", Philosophy of Science 74:1-27.
6. Lewis, David (1969), Convention. A Philosophical Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
7. Pawlowitsch, Christina (2006), "Why Evolution Does not Always Lead to an Optimal Signaling System", working paper, University of Vienna.
8. Skyrms, Brian (1996), Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. _ (2000), "Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models", Philosophy of Science 67:94-113.
10. Swinkels, Jereon (1993), "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games", Games and Economic Behavior 5:455-484.
11. Weibull, Jörgen (1995), Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.