Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 254, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 843-849

  Hofbauer, Josef ^a   Huttegger, Simon M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bifurcation; Game theory; Selection mutation dynamics; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EQUILIBRIUM; FEASIBILITY STUDY; GAME THEORY; MUTATION; SIGNALING;

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; DYNAMICS; FEASIBILITY STUDY; GAME; MUTATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SIGNAL PROCESSING; SIGNAL TRANSDUCTION;

ADAPTATION, BIOLOGICAL; ANIMALS; COMMUNICATION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, GENETIC; MUTATION; SELECTION (GENETICS);

EID: 52149114433     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.07.010     Document Type: Article

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