Endogenous preferences and social-dilemma institutions

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 162, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 627-660

  Poulsen, Anders ^a   Poulsen, Odile ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751034203     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245606779252742     Document Type: Article

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