On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 31-50

  Guttman, Joel M ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

C72; D00; D64; Endogenous preferences; Indirect evolutionary models; Opportunistic behavior; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003094544     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(99)00046-4     Document Type: Article

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