Social capital and endogenous preferences

Public Choice

Volumn 123, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 171-196

  Poulsen, Anders U ^a   Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard ^a  

^a AARHUS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22544454142     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-0266-0     Document Type: Article

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