Sorting out the seeking: The economics of individual motivations

Public Choice

Volumn 103, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 231-258

  Schram, Arthur ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034402862     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005036003561     Document Type: Article

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