Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 637-679

  Sandholm, William H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

coordination games; evolution of preferences; Evolutionary game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042333354     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/redy.2001.0128     Document Type: Article

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