The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 298-319

  Bisin, Alberto ^a   Verdier, Thierry ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035315050     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2678     Document Type: Article

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