Perfect versus Imperfect Observability - An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 174-190

  Huck, Steffen ^a,b   Müller, Wieland ^a,c  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^c Department of Economics   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008369785     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0746     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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