Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation

Theoretical Population Biology

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 352-363

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^a,b   Taylor, Christine ^a,b   Imhof, Lorens A ^c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Coordination game; Favored strategy; Frequency dependent selection; Imitation process; Language dynamics; Moran process; Replicator dynamics; Risk dominance; Selected strategy; Stochastic dynamics

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; MUTATION; POPULATION SIZE; STOICHIOMETRY;

ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; COMPARATIVE STUDY; EVOLUTION; GAME; GENETIC SELECTION; GENETIC VARIABILITY; GENETICS; HUMAN; MUTATION; PHENOTYPE; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; POPULATION GENETICS; PROBABILITY; RISK; SEMANTICS; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS; STATISTICS; VALIDATION STUDY;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; DATA INTERPRETATION, STATISTICAL; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; GENETIC VARIATION; GENETICS, POPULATION; HUMANS; MARKOV CHAINS; MODELS, GENETIC; MUTATION; PHENOTYPE; POPULATION DENSITY; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PROBABILITY; RISK; SELECTION (GENETICS); SELECTION, GENETIC; SEMANTICS; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES; VARIATION (GENETICS);

EID: 33749266908     PISSN: 00405809     EISSN: 10960325     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2006.07.006     Document Type: Article

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